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7723 
Civil No. 7723 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. J. MEAGHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UINTAH GAS COMPANY and 
VALLEY FUEL S.UPPLY COM-
PANY, 
Defendants, 
RAY PHEBUS, ASHLEY VALLEY 
OIL COMPANY, PAUL STOCK 
and JOE T. JUHAN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS RAY PHEBUS, 
PAUL STOCK and JOE T. JUHAN 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UINTAH 
Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, Judge. 
F I L E TliA.RLEY W. GUS·TIN • 0 UDWARD F. RICHARDS 
NOV 2 7 1951 CARVEL MATTSSON Attorneys for Appellants 
------------------------------·--.. ---&a;y Phebus, Paul Stock and 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Uta.fJ" oe T. Juhan. 
OLIVER W. STEADMAN 
Of Counsel for Paul Stock. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. J. :JIE ... ~GHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
YS. 
UINT.A.H GAS CO:JIP ANY and 
··v-ALLEY Fl~EL SUPPLY COl\1-
PANY, 
Defemdants, 
RAY PHEBUS, ASHLEY , ... ALLEY 
OIL COMPANY, PAUL STOCK 
and JOE T. JUHAN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 
7723 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS RAY PHEBUS, 
PAUL STOCK and JOE T. JUHAN 
This reply will be addressed, in the main, to the 
assertion in respondent's brief that our brief in chief 
"fails to state the whole truth and therefore casts the 
[case] in an inaccurate factual atmosphere" (p. 49). 
References herein made, unless otherwise indicated, are 
to pages of respondent's brief. 
I. 
Respondent poses the question: "On the subject 
of superior information, do appellants contend that 
Meagher knew when he asked for this release that the 
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property overlay an oil field~" (p. 49-50). Our answer 
is that there cannot be attributed to Meagher the inno-
cence that the question would imply, and that he had 
every reason to believe that the property did overlay 
an oil field. We point to the following: 
(a) He acknowledged, by signing the modification 
agreement, Exhibit A-5, that gas had been discovered 
in commercial quantities prior to May 21, 1927. As a 
resident of V-ernal he was aware that gas was furnished 
to its inhabitants from the wells on the property up 
to a short time prior to November 1941, the execution 
of the agreement, Exhibit A-17, from Valley Fuel Sup-
ply Company to. Juhan. 
(b) Meagher's letter, Exhibit A-28, to Phebus on 
November 9, 1944 states that he, Meagher, had been 
"requested for a lease on the 480 acres of land" and "I 
have a possibility of getting the area drilled." Prior to 
November 9, 1944 Meagher studiously avoided any refer-
ence to a new lease and to the prospect of getting the 
property drilled. It was after the Stock release of 
October 21, 1944 that Meagher became so bold as to make 
disclosure that he had been approached for an oil lease. 
The previous correspondence contained no reference 
to the possibility of drilling. Meagher knew through 
the medium of the modification agreement, A-5, which 
he signed as one of the royalty owners, that paragraph 
23 thereof gave the lessee the right to duplicate a bona 
fide offer of others to drill for oil upon the premises. 
II. 
Respondent's counsel, in his argument before the 
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court, coneeded that the reeitals contained in the release 
\Yere not true, a frankness not found in his brief. The 
release \Yas trans1nitted to Stock \Yith the letter of Octo-
ber lG, 19-±± and presun1ably prepared by J\[eagher's 
attorney on that day. \\T e cannot believe it was a 
mere inadYertence that the release made no reference 
to the modification agreement of niay 21, 1927. we say 
that ~{eagher intentionally diverted Stock's attention 
fron1 the modification agreement and pointed, by specific 
quoted language, to the book and page in the recorder's 
office of a portion of the original Sheridan lease that 
had been expressly abrogated by the modification agree-
nlent. ''; e believe this was done purposely and with the 
intention to spell out a contractual obligation to release 
when in fact such obligation did not exist. Meagher 
knew that the portion of the original Sheridan lease 
quoted in the October 21, 1944 document had been abro-
gated by the modification agreement of May 21, 1927 
because he signed the last mentioned document. Stock 
was not a party to the modification agreement nor did he 
sign it. 
III. 
The question posed by respondent as stated above in 
I is answered, also the statement: "We defy counsel to 
point out any representation made by Meagher to Stock 
or anyone else which was contrary to fact and known 
by l\Ieagher to be so." (p. 46). The disclosure to Phebus 
on N overnber 9, 1944 that Meagher had been solicited 
for a lease carne after the release was sent to Stock for 
his signature. The omission to advise Stock not only of 
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the modification agreement but of the solicitation for a 
lease is a type of non-disclosure indicative of fraud. The 
clear purport of the Meagher to Stock correspondence 
was that Stock had no interest. This also was contrary 
to fact. Furthermore, Meagher represented both by his 
letters to Stock and by the release that the instrument 
of October 21, 1944 was for the purpose of clearing the 
record (Exhibit A-26, our brief p. 50). This was not 
~ieagher's real purpose because he now contends through 
the instrument a transfer of interest, which he previously 
stated did not exist. We submit that the present asser-
tion, the previous non-disclosure and the avowed purpose 
of the document all spell out conduct of "one ·who is 
deceitfully scheming to cheat another" (p. 43). The let-
ter written by the attorney daughter of respondent trans-
mitting the release to Stock for signature calls the docu-
ment a "release" and not a transfer, and speaks of 
Stock's interest in the past tense (Exhibit A-27, our brief 
p. 52). Everything was done that could be done to lead 
Stock to believe that he was not transferring a present 
interest. 
IV. 
Respondent says: "Thus, regardless of whether 
Stock was under a contractual duty to release or was 
voluntarily turning back his lessees' rights, the fact re-
mains that he did make the transfer and did thereby 
cease to have any obligations as a lessee. These facts 
alone dispose of the issue of consideration." (p. 50). In 
reply to the theory of consideration we say: 
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(a) Exhibit .A.-30 'Yas recorded November 3, 19-±4. 
Six days after the recording of tl1e instrun1ent, ~[eagher, 
in his letter to Phebus of N oven1ber 9, 19-±-±, said: "I 
belieYe vou lmo"T I 'Yould not ask for surrender of anv-
.,, . 
body's rights 'Yithout pay1nent, but in this instance actu-
ally no rights exist for anybody through that old lease 
of 192±.~~ (Exhibit A-28, our brief, p. 53-54). It is un-
disputed that :Jieagher paid nothing for the Stock re-
lease. His state of mind evidenced on November 9, 1944 
applies equally to Stock as well as to Phebus. He wa8 
not bargaining for an interest nor did he expect one. 
But counsel no'Y say that respondent had in mind the 
undisclosed thought that he was assuming, by the re-
lease, a liability and relieving Stock of the same. As to 
this we point to the previous decision of this court 
holding: 
"The 'Sundance formation' was penetrated 
by operations under the lease, but no oil in com-
mercial quantities was discovered. No condition 
arose subsequent to that time that called for 
further exploration for oil upon the part of the 
lessee, * * * ." 
(b) The term "transfer" is wishful thinking of 
respondent, asserted for the first time after the dis-
covery of oil. The language of the release itself and 
the correspondence prior thereto is sufficient to demon-
strate that the terms "transfer" or "quitclaim" are mis-
nomers and not intended nor bargained for. Respondent 
has not pointed to any obligation that Stock had and 
that Meagher assumed. In fact, respondent is effectually 
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prevented from such assertion by the previous decision 
of this court. Stock was the possessor of a continuing 
oil mineral estate. In the former decision of this court 
it is said: 
"Having complied with those provisions the 
lessee has given consideration for that right. 
That continuing right is not an unnecessary 
burden upon the lessor's property as a subsequent 
discovery of oil in the locality places him in a 
position to enforce further exploration for oil 
and gas by the lessee at the latter's risk of losing 
his continuing rights (Pars. 6 and 8). If anyone 
comes along who thinks there are possibilities 
in the_ land, if further exploration is conducted, 
the lessor's hands are not tied. He may compel 
the lessee to duplicate the offer of the newly 
interested party (provided the offer is bona 
fide) at the risk of losing his rights (Par. 23)." 
(Italics ours) . 
The argument of a "legal consideration" in the sense 
that Stock was under a liability, which liability or obli-
gation Meagher assumed, is dissipated by the above. 
v. 
On page 32 respondent says: 
"Meagher had already given formal and ade-
quate notice to all concerned that he claimed 
interests in the property adverse to the interests 
claimed by them. What better notice could be 
given than the pendency of an unfinished quiet 
title action~ The lis pendens filed May 4, 1945, 
notified not only these appellants but the world 
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that the property rights in this land 'vere in 
litigation and until that litigation was concluded 
no one, n1uch less the litigants, had any basis for 
assun1ing that ~Ieagher 'vas willing to accept 
less than his la,vful interest." (Italics ours). 
The above statement is calculated, we believe, to 
have the reader think that l\Ieagher, by a lis pendens, 
gaye notice to the 'vorld that he was claiming one-half 
of the oil mineral estate through the medium of the Stock 
release. There are other similar expressions throughout 
respondent's brief. The fact is that the lis pendens of 
:Jiay 4, 1945, Exhibit A-42, was executed on behalf of 
Juhan in connection with his answer filed in the case 
on that day and gave notice to the world that Juhan 
claimed the so-called Sheridan oil and gas lease of June 
4-, 1924- as modified by the modification agreement of 
~Iay 21, 1927. Meagher at the time, through his second 
amended complaint, claimed that he was the owner in 
fee of the land unencumbered by any leasehold and this 
he confirmed on September 1, 1945 by his verified reply 
(R. 41, Exhibit A-29). The verified reply alleges that 
a leasehold did not exist, the same having been termin-
ated by the express provisions of the lease and by aban-
donment. These issues on the first appeal were decided 
adverse to Meagher. The quoted statement would seem 
to be a reckless one. Meagher never filed a lis pendens 
in this action. 
VI. 
The letter from Meagher to Stock under date of 
June 18, 1945, Exhibit A-39, is distorted by respondent. 
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Respondent would have it appear that the release of 
October 21, 1944, was the subject matter of the letter 
in connection with the quitclaim and assignment given 
Chas. Hill under date of April 14, 1945 (Exhibit A-19). 
The quitclailn and assignment, recorded April 25, 1945, 
acted as a quitclaim of any interest that Stock might have 
in the property as well as an assignment of any chose in 
action. Respondent says, in a strained construction, of 
the letter of June 18, 1945: "He pointed out that he, 
Meagher, was now the owner of Stock's former interest 
in the property." (p. 28). On page 29 counsel say: 
"We are convinced that no impropriety would be inten-
tionally indulged by any of our opposing counsel. But 
in discussing this point we must call attention to an 
inadvertence which involves a gross misstatement of 
the record. * * * When appellants say that 'respondent 
made no complaint' they overlook the vigorous com-
plaint addressed to Stock in the letter (A-39) discussed 
above." On page 82 respondent says: "In June of 1945 
Meagher, who had _learned of Stock's quitclaim to Hill 
but did not know the purpose, wrote to Stock. He pointed 
out that Stock had already transferred his lease interest 
to Meagher." (Italics ours) 
The above quoted portions of respondent's brief and 
other similar assertions would lead one to believe that 
Meagher, by his letter to Stock of June 18, 1945, construed 
the release of October 21, 1944 as a transfer of interest 
and was calling upon Stock to explain an inconsistency 
between the release on the one hand and the quitclaim 
and assignment in favor of Hill on the other hand. The 
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letter is not susceptible of that construction. In fact 
it says nothing about the release of October 21, 19-tt 
The letter refers specifically to an assignment by l\{ea-
gher to Stock and Phebus under date of October 11, 1930 
(Exhibit _.:\_-40) of one-third of a 2% oil royalty interest. 
The letter of June 18, 1945, Exhibit A-39, has not been 
quoted from in 'Yhole or in part in either of the two 
preceding briefs. \VT e quote from the body of the letter 
as follows: 
~'Dear ~Ir. Stock: 
When you and Mr. Phebus endeavored to 
get the Standard Oil Co. of Calif. to drill on 
the 'Gas Well' ranch those of us who held royalty 
interests on oil produced and marketed assigned 
one-third of our interests to you and Mr. Phebus, 
so that you would have fair compensation for your 
endeavors. As the Standard did nothing it ap-
pears you should have reassigned the royalty 
interests and the abstract of title does not show 
your re-assignment. Will you be good enough to 
execute and acknowledge the enclosed instrument 
for its purpose and send it to me. 
"It may be that you prefer to sign one instru-
ment reconveying to each party the one-third 
interest obtained in 1930; if so, I shall have the 
one instrument show a respective re-conveyance 
of what you and Mr. Phebus obtained, which will 
show the other owners,-Dick, Sheridans, Wyman 
and Preas. You and Mr. Phebus owe a deed to me 
for my one-third of 2% of the royalty and a deed 
to each of the others who contrubted ( contrib-
uted). The one deed returning therein to each his 
rights will be sufficient. It will save me in ab-
stracting the title to the land to have but the one 
deed. 
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"I was surprised to find that you gave a 
quit-claim deed to one Chas. Hill of Denver for 
your interests in the 480 acres of land, which I 
own and have owned. That deed, my attorneys 
tell me, may involve you in this one-third of 2% 
interest. They suggest that you obtain from Hill 
a deed for the one-third of. 2% of the oil. It can 
do Hill no other good, but it surprised me thag 
(that) you gave Hill such a deed as you did. 
Those deeds just mess up an abstract of title 
and there is no advantage in executing them. Will 
you kindly tell me the purpose Hill has in obtain-
ing such a deed from you and what consideration, 
if any, he gave you. 
"I cannot believe you intend any unfriend-
liness towards me ; I never was other than friend-
ly with you and for your interests. I will appre-
ciate very much a candid letter from you telling 
me all the facts and if there is anything you wish 
me to hold confidential you may depend on my 
doing so. 
"If you will advise me immediately whether 
or not you will execute a deed re-conveying the 
interests of those who assigned one-third of their 
rights I shall have it prepared. You wll (will) 
need to obtain a similar deed from Hill. Please 
advise me what to prepare. 
Very truly yours, 
N. J. Meagher." 
The foregoing letter is contrary to that which re-
spondent claims. Whether these appellants are guilty 
or whether it is respondent who is guilty of attempting 
to cast the case "in an inaccurate factual atmosphere" 
is perhaps beside the point. The important thing is 
that respondent on June 18, 1945, having become aware 
of the conveyance to Hill, and having concluded to speak 
of it by written communication to Stock, would have 
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unequivocally called attention to the release of eight 
n1onths before as a transfer, quitrlaim or conveyance if 
that \Yas his claim. ~leagher did not do this. He stated 
that the quitclaim and assignment to Hill had the effect 
of conveying Stock's interest in the royalty. Once having 
dignified the situation, it became Meagher's duty to fully 
disclose his understanding of the previous document, 
the release, and concerning which he said nothing. The 
only answer is that he claimed nothing for the document 
but was concerned only about his royalty interest. In-
deed, for ~Ieagher to have claimed a leasehold interest 
through the medium of the release would have been 
inconsistent with his reply subsequently filed in the ac-
tion on September 1, 1945. The discovery of oil and self-
interest prompts respondent to distort the letter. 
VII. 
Respondent begs the question on our point 9 pertain-
ing to the one-third of 2% oil royalty issue. As the record 
will show, the royalty is assignable and expressly made 
a covenant running with the land. True, as counsel say, 
it is similar to a landowners royalty in that it is not 
dependent for its existence upon a lease. The royalty 
under consideration is payable not in~ kind but in money, 
representing a percentage of the oil produced and saved 
from the property to be paid by the holder of the lease 
or the purchaser of the oil produced therefrom to the 
record owner of the royalty. While we have said this 
before and pointed to the controlling exhibits, we must 
reiterate the situation because of respondent's conten-
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tion that Meagher became "the beneficial owner thereof" 
( p. 77), even though on October 11, 1930, by Exhibit A -40, 
the legal title was admittedly transferred to Stock and 
Phebus (p. 78). It is not disputed that Stock and Phebus 
assigned the royalty interest to others. There is no trust 
involved in the situation and, in any event, this court 
could not declare a trust to exist without first having all 
of the necessary parties before it. Without specific per-
formance, if Meagher is now entitled to the same based 
upon the promise of Stock and Phebus to re-convey, the 
record title will remain undisturbed and a declaration 
of this court, in the present action, a futile gesture. 
The court has before it, through the recorded docu-
ments, a complete chain of title. Our brief in chief, of 
necessity, dwelt extensively and minutely on those docu-
ments. Respondent's brief, filled with unsupported state-
ments of the character mentioned above, has made it 
necessary for us to dwell further .upon the situation 
through the medium of this reply brief. We have not 
cast the case in an inaccurate factual atmosphere. At 
the risk of belaboring the point we have asserted, as 
vigorously as we can, the integrity of contract with which 
this case is primarily involved and which respondent 
would seek to avoid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARLEY W. GUS·TIN 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS 
CARVEL MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Ray Phebus, Paul Stock and 
Joe T. Juhan. 
OLIVER W. STEADMAN 
Of Counsel for Paul Stock. 
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